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FROM DURHAM TO BRAWNER,
A FUTILE JOURNEY
BERNARD L. DIAMOND*
Durham v. United States,' in 1954, was the first major change in the
law of criminal responsibility of the mentally ill in this century. I sus-
pect United States v. Brawner 2 will be the last such major change.
This is not because I believe Brawner is such a satisfactory solution to
the problems of the mentally ill offender that no further legal progress
need occur, but rather that the history of events between 1954 and
1972 demonstrates that these problems are not soluble through manip-
ulation of the legal rules of responsibility.
I think it is fair to say that when Judge Bazelon revitalized the New
Hampshire rule of 1869-18711 through Durham, he was hopeful of also
revitalizing the cooperative, understanding, and progressive relation-
ship between psychiatry and the law which those early New Hampshire
decisions represented.' New Hampshire's Justice Doe, through ex-
tensive correspondence with Isaac Ray, the most knowledgeable for-
ensic psychiatrist in the United States,5 carefully planned both the sub-
stance and the strategy of the New Hampshire reform. Evidently
Judge Bazelon, like Justice Doe, was convinced that revision of the
legal rules of insanity made in accord with the best available psychi-
atric advice and offering encouragement to the more progressive psy-
chiatric promises of the time would result in real change, change of
benefit both to the mentally ill offender and to the society victimized
by his irrational behavior.
The purpose of this article is to discuss why such benefits have not
materialized from Durham and why they should not be expected from
* Professor of Law and Criminology, University of California, Berkeley; Clinical
Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco. A.B., 1935, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley; M.D., 1939, University of California, San Francisco.
I. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
4. Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration In The Jurispru-
dence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183 (1953).
5. See Diamond, Isaac Ray and The Trial of Daniel M'Naghten, 112 AM. I.
PSYCHIATRY 651 (1956), for a description of the crucial role that Ray played in 19th
century forensic psychiatry.
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Brawner or other recent modifications of the laws concerned with re-
sponsibility of mentally ill offenders."
THE CHALLENGE THAT WAS Durham
Legal reforms assume that either the affected individuals will rise to
the challenge of the new law or that the law will, by the power of its
authority alone, force the realization of the progress inherent in the
legal change. Little of either has occurred as a consequence of Dur-
ham and there is no reason to believe that Brawner will fare better.
In a certain sense the medical-psychological treatment of the crimi-
nal offender and the punitive-justice system are competing over the
destiny of the individual offender. I have little doubt that if either
method were clearly superior to the other the competition would have
been decided by now and the successful method would have prevailed.
To be sure, there are issues other than those of utility. Punishing the
criminal is not only for the purpose of moral reform of the offender
and to serve as a deterrent to the would-be offender, it also fulfills
other needs. It furthers the mythology of justice, creating the illusion
that the world is fair. By nurturing emotions of vengeance it furthers
social solidarity and protects against the terrifying anxiety that the
forces of good might not triumph against the forces of evil after all.
As powerful as these theological notions are, I do not think they
would prevent the dominance of any system of treatment of the crimi-
nal offender, mentally ill or not, that really worked. The failure of
Durham lay, not in the good intentions of the law, but rather in the
inability of psychiatry, both as a body of scientific knowledge and as
a profession, to meet the challenge set forth by the Durham court. If
psychiatry could have fulfilled its promise to the law, there would be
no hesitation today as to the appropriate legal rules to permit it to gain
priority over the ancient rituals of punishment and revenge.
Durham anticipated that the psychiatric expert would be able to ac-
curately differentiate the mentally ill offender who committed his crime
as a result of his psychopathology from the mentally sound offender
who committed his crime for more normal reasons such as greed, pas-
sion or other evil intent. Furthermore, Durham anticipated that the
expert could communicate the basis for this differentiation with suffi-
6. Such as United States v. Wade, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
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cient clarity to permit the trier of fact to make a rational decision,
fully taking into consideration the psychiatric evidence, yet not blindly
submitting to the authority of the expert.
Neither Durham nor any rule of criminal responsibility directly
deals with the issue of treatment. A grossly psychotic defendant is to
be found not guilty by reason of insanity even if there is no prospect
of his successful treatment. An insanity verdict which disregarded
treatment prospects made good sense in the days of M'Naghten when
the sane felon often went to the gallows and the insane were confined
in an asylum for the rest of their lives. But with the near abolition of
capital punishment and with the expectation that the offender, sane or
insane, must someday be released back into the community, the ef-
ficacy of treatment becomes a matter of vital importance. It may
not be addressed directly, either by the rule of responsibility or by the
evidence presented to the jury, but it will surely be taken into account
openly or covertly by the legislature or appellate court that is consid-
ering legal reform as well as by the trier of fact in rendering a verdict
on the individual case.
In short, Durham, as does Brawner and every other modem rule of
criminal responsibility of the mentally ill, expects that the expert can
make a precise diagnostic formulation; that he can communicate the
basis for that formulation to the trier of fact so that a decision can be
made as to whether the defendant is "mad or bad"; and that for those
defendants who are found to be "mad," effective treatment can be pro-
vided in some sort of non-punitive institution.
THE INCONSISTENCY OF PSYCHIATRIC PROGRESS
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW
I submit that today the psychiatrist is unable to perform effectively
any of these tasks well; further, that he does them less well now than
he did eighteen years ago when Durham was adopted; and still further,
that he is not going to do better under any variant of the American
Law Institute formulation, no matter how legally sophisticated it may
be presented. My explanation for this dismal prognostication follows.
Consider first the matter of accurate diagnosis. Psychiatry, as a
branch of medicine, shared a need for precision of diagnosis. In med-
icine, as the fruits of the scientific method became available to the
practicing physician, it became imperative that the pathology of the
individual patient be exactly defined, that causal agents be detected and
Vol. 1973:1091
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that remedies based upon rational scientific bases be prescribed. Such
scientific medicine brought great triumphs such as the virtual eradica-
tion of polio and some other dread diseases. The scourge of cancer
is yet to be conquered, but no one today doubts that when, and if, it is
conquered it will be by scientific medicine and not by art or by faith.
Until relatively recently it was assumed that progress in psychiatry
would be along similar lines: first the definition of pathology (that is,
the diagnosis), then the discovery of the etiology, and then surely
would come the remedy and the prevention. Since 1911, when Bleuler
coined the term "schizophrenia' and so brilliantly defined the basic
psychopathology of that psychosis," exhaustive research has been con-
ducted throughout the world to further delineate the precise nature of
the mental changes underlying this dread illness, and many therapies
have been proposed and tried out in practice. Much of value has
been discovered by this research and clinical experience, but little of
this is useful to the law. If anything, the modem research on schizo-
phrenia adds confusion and uncertainty to questions about which the
law demands clarity and definitive answers. The vast amount of in-
formation which has been accumulated about the condition called
schizophrenia cannot be integrated in such a way as to be helpful,
or even understandable, to the law in its dealings with the mentally
ill. If anything, the lack of integration of our knowledge can only give
the legal mind the impression that nothing is known about this mental
disease, if it is a disease. It is not true, of course, that nothing about
schizophrenia is known. The difficulty is that we do not know the
kinds of facts about it which would be convenient to the determination
of the legal definition of criminal responsibility.
Modem research raises doubts as to whether schizophrenia is one
disease, or many diseases, or no disease. It may only be a condition,
probably an abnormal condition, but conceivably a normal variation of
human response to stress. There may be associated biochemical and
physiological abnormalities which may or may not be significant.
There certainly are profound abnormalities of thought and feeling
process. Yet these abnormalities may fluctuate to such a degree that
they elude clinical detection. Predictions of outcome are possible for
statistical groups but have little reliability for the individual with whom
the law is concerned.
7. E. BLEULER, DBElNTiA PRAECOX ODER GRUPPE DER SCHIZOPHRENIEN (1911)
(4. Abteilung, 1 Hilfte).
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Although the behavioral manifestations of schizophrenia can be
grossly obvious, the disorders of thought and feeling behind those be-
havioral patterns may involve only the most subtle deviations from the
normal, deviations which may be very difficult to describe convinc-
ingly to the layman. If the schizophrenic defendant is grossly psy-
chotic with delusions and hallucinations, there will be agreement
among the experts as to the diagnosis (but not necessarily as to his
legal responsibility). But grossly psychotic persons are seldom the
focus of legal controversy. The so-called "borderline schizophrenic"
may be intuitively regarded by the experienced psychiatrist as the sick-
est of all. Yet the subtlety of the psychopathology and its seeming
irrelevance to the legal issues at trial usually makes it impossible to
convince the jury that the defendant is not mentally sound.
What has been said about schizophrenia may be reiterated for other
conditions, especially the character disorders. Here the clinical deline-
ation of the disorder, if it be a disorder and not a normal variant, is
even more blurred than in the case of schizophrenia. There is little
expert agreement as to the nature of even the most flagrant cases.
Some psychiatrists regard such conditions as moral problems having
nothing to do with medicine or psychiatry8 and others believe certain
character disorders may be a serious mental illness allied to the major
psychoses.' There is some evidence, which cannot be disregarded, that
the poor impulse control and violent behavior associated with certain
character disorders may be the consequence of abnormal brain rhythms
and other brain pathology.10
As a general trend in psychiatric practice in the eighteen years be-
tween Durham and Braivner, there is much less interest in the defini-
tive diagnosis of the mental patient. Many psychiatrists of recent train-
ing believe (incorrectly, I think) that the diagnosis doesn't matter, that
efforts to classify and categorize dehumanizes the therapeutic process
and obscures the "real" psychological events. Diagnoses may be re-
garded as merely labels and mental disease as existing only by virtue
of the labels which are attached to persons who are then compelled
to live up to the labels. The label may be applied not for the pur-
8. T. SZASZ, THE MYITH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
9. H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SArIT (4th ed. 1964).
10. V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1972); Henry, Positive
Spike Discharges in the EEG and Behavior Abnormality, in EEG AND BEHAVIOR 315
(G. Glaser ed. 1963).
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poses of explaining or communicating the nature of the illness but
rather for the purpose of manipulating the recipient of the label as an
"instrument of social action."11
The above discussion of the modem uncertainties of psychiatric
practice may be countered by the argument that the law is not con-
cemed with diagnosis and with what is and what is not a mental
disease by clinical standards. Because of the intense controversy over
just these issues which developed out of Durham,12 there evolved Mc-
Donald v. United States,'3 which provides a legal definition presum-
ably independent of the vagaries of the individual psychiatric expert
or of classification systems:
[A] mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the
mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and sub-
stantially impairs behavior controls.' 4
Brawner makes it specifically clear that the McDonald definition is
still applicable.' 5 This is a good definition and I approve of it, not
only for legal purposes but for clinical use as well. But it does not
solve the problem of contemporary psychiatric confusion. Unless the
psychiatric expert can testify as to exactly what condition the defendant
suffers from and can give a particular description of the manner in
which the abnormality affects those mental and emotional processes
relevant to the criminal act, he will have no credibility before the jury.
However, the psychiatric expert, if he is scrupulously honest, can sel-
dom so testify. His evidence should rather sound something like this:
I think, but I am not certain, that the defendant has a mental disease,
or an abnormality, or what merely may be a normal variation, which
has substantially affected his mental or emotional processes in ways
which I find difficult to understand and explain to you and this has
possibly, but maybe not, substantially affected his behavior controls
in ways which could be, but are not necessarily, relevant to the crimi-
nal act of which he is accused and which, as yet, I am not even sure
he has committed.
If this is the true expert opinion, it will have little significance to
the jury no matter how it is fleshed in with clinical details. I submit
11. Regretfully, I have forgotten who originated this excellent phrase.
12. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Bur-
ger, J., concurring).
13. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
14. Id. at 851.
15. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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that Brawner does not remedy this difficulty even with its inclusion
of the McDonald definition. The problem is psychiatric, not legal.
I have written elsewhere about the law's quest for certainty and its
dismay over the uncertainty of the psychiatrist, usually expressed in the
pontification that psychiatry is not yet an "exact science."'1  Paradox-
ically, the present confusion of psychiatry in regard to some of its
most basic tenets has resulted from the greatly accelerated increase of
scientific knowledge about mental illness. In medicine, as in all sci-
ence, certitude often reflects dogma and lack of valid information.
The psychiatry of the 1970's is well advanced over that of the 1950's,
but it is less usable by the law. I predict the evidentiary value of
psychiatric testimony will become less, rather than more, credible in
the coming decades as further increase in knowledge adds to the con-
fusion.
THE RELUCTANT PSYCHIATRIST
Another problem not solved by Brawner is the reluctance of com-
petent, well-trained psychiatrists to involve themselves in the legal sys-
tem. Those of us who write and talk a lot about law and psychiatry
and who are directly related to the teaching of psychiatry in the law
schools seldom go to court. Forensic psychiatry is much more inter-
esting and less traumatic to the ego when practiced from the armchair
rather than from the witness chair. In the period between Durham
and Brawner there has been no increase in the number of well-quali-
fied psychiatrists who are willing to serve as experts, and there con-
tinues the widespread use of grossly incompetent pseudo-experts who
are brought into the courtroom by cynical attorneys who have no faith
in their witness's testimony but are quite willing to use them for what-
ever effect they may have on the jury. For example, in a certain juris-
diction in California, I know of a physician who is crudely incompetent
in his willingness to make snap psychiatric judgments accommodating
to the prosecution. The local district attorney is openly contemptuous
of this pseudo-psychiatrist and privately gives his opinions no credi-
bility. But, at the same time, he frequently employs him to examine
a defendant immediately after apprehension, knowing that an opinion
resulting from an examination as soon as possible after the commission
of the crime carries greater weight with the jury.17
16. Diamond, The Scientific Method and the Law, 19 HASTiNGS L. Rnv. 179,
194 (1967).
17. The widely held belief that the sooner a defendant is examined after commis-
Vol. 1973:1091
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There are a number of reasons why the competent psychiatrist so
willingly leaves forensic psychiatry to his more dubious colleagues.
Service as an expert witness is often damaging to one's self-esteem, it
is almost always poor public relations, it usually requires learning a
whole new set of concepts and values, and it often does violence to the
intimate therapist-patient relationship.
The law presumes that the expert witness is detached, impartial, ob-
jective and unconcerned with the outcome of the case at bar. To
further such objectivity, Washington v. United States"s prohibited the
expert from giving an opinion as to the existence of mental disease or
defect and whether the alleged criminal act was the "product" of such
mental disease or defect since these are the ultimate issues which must
be decided by the trier of fact without benefit of expert opinion. For-
tunately, this unsound restriction on expert testimony has been alle-
viated by Brawner.19 Such detachment is more appropriate to the
forensic pathologist than to the psychiatrist. Most psychiatrists con-
ceive their primary role as therapist, and their loyalty is to their pa-
tients. To have another human suffer as a consequence of one's ob-
jective testimony is not compatible with the healing function of the
physician. Some of us, even though we do forensic work, feel so
strongly about this that we will refuse to testify if our testimony will
not aid the defendant in a criminal trial. This does not mean that
we will testify for the defendant if the psychiatric findings do not war-
rant such testimony or that we are in any way dishonest in our testi-
mony; we just do not wish to become involved if our testimony will be
hurtful to another.
I have suggested the principle (which I know to be legally unsound,
but which I believe to be medically correct) that psychiatric expert
testimony should be reserved exclusively for the defense in criminal
trials. Let the prosecutor prove sanity or other elements of the requi-
site mental state required by the definition of the crime by the use of
sion of the crime, the more valid is the appraisal of his mental state is not necessarily
true. In my experience, it often requires considerable distance in time from the
criminal act to gather the information which is necessary to accurately evaluate the
mental state of the defendant. Also, time lends perspectives which may be obscured
by events surrounding apprehension of the defendant. His fear and distrust at the
time of apprehension may prevent him from revealing much about his mental state.
Opinions emphasizing the defendant's "objective" appearance may be incorrect and
misleading.
18. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
19. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1005-07 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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non-expert witnesses or by the circumstances of the crime. Such a
procedure would eliminate the troublesome battle of the experts as
well as being more compatible with the psychiatrist's role as healer.
I have no expectation that this suggestion will be adopted by any court.
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER
The role of the psychiatrist in the treatment of the criminal offender,
mentally ill or not, is still uncertain, and the progress which was antici-
pated by Durham and other reforms of the criminal law of responsi-
bility has not materialized. Some institutions for the criminally insane
remain like medieval dungeons, unfit for human habitation and de-
grading to inmate and staff alike.20 Others appear clean and modem
and less crowded, but the treatment programs tend to be superficial,
routinized, and often administered by untrained, inexpert personnel
with little consideration of the particular therapeutic needs of the in-
dividual. Poorly conceived treatments, such as psychosurgery, are
sometimes recommended, which results in justifiable storms of protest
over the ethical issues involved in such experimentation. Institutions
may retreat in the face of such public protest and reduce what few
appropriate treatment programs are in effect.2 1
There is as yet no thoroughly reliable psychiatric treatment method
which can be applied to the mentally ill offender and which can ensure
both his rehabilitation and the safety of society. Much additional re-
search and experimentation with a diversity of potentially useful meth-
ods is required. But grave doubts arise as to the ethical propriety of
applying experimental treatments to captive, coerced subjects who are
in no position to give informed consent.22
Despite the great public concern over the rising crime rate there is
not a corresponding interest in the research and development of psy-
chiatric treatment programs for offenders. It is my impression that
there is somewhat less tendency now than there was in 1954 to regard
crime as a psychiatric problem, to be remedied by treatment methods.
Much of the federal funding which has become available in recent
20. See Wiseman's documentary movie, Titticut Follies. See Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971).
21. San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, March 12, 1972, at 16, col. 1.
22. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, THE INSTITUTIONAL GUIDE TO HEW POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS 2 (1971).
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years as a consequence of public alarm over crime has gone into hard-
ware and is concerned only with apprehension and custody of the crim-
inal, not his treatment.
A source of special difficulty is the problem of integrating treatment
of the patient who requires legal custody with the more progressive
treatment programs of the community mental health movement.
These community programs emphasize voluntary participation, open
door hospitals, out-patient clinics and avoidance of isolation of the
patient from the community. A patient who is defined as dangerous
and whose custody must be secured because of his legal status does not
fit into such a community program. Hence, treatment of such pa-
tients is expected to take place in an old-fashioned maximum security
hospital or in a prison. It is very difficult to adequately staff such in-
stitutions and many psychiatrists believe that the authoritarian atmos-
phere inherent in such organizations precludes successful treatment
even if adequate staff were available. In any event, there is little in
the United States to compare with the small, expensive, intensive treat-
ment institutions which exist in some European countries. 23
The day is long gone when the public saw psychiatry as the panacea
for whatever ails the individual and humanity. The medical model
of treatment has serious limitations when applied to social problems
and whatever may be the future solutions to problems of crime and
control of the criminal, I do not expect the psychiatrist to play the
dominant role. Accordingly, the differentiation of the morally re-
sponsible sane offender from the nonresponsible mentally ill offender
may not be the critical issue that it has been in the past.
THE LIBERTARIAN POSTURE
There are several different postures which one might take toward
the failure of psychiatry to provide a viable program of treatment and
rehabilitation for the mentally ill offender. There is the iconoclastic
position pyschiatrist Thomas Szasz has expressed in his many writ-
ings.24 In Szasz's view mental illness (with some few exceptions) is
not conceptualized as a disease in any medical sense of that term, but
23. See, e.g., G. STORUP, TREATING THE UNTREATABLE, CHRONIC CRIMINALS AT
HERSTEDvESTm (1968).
24. LAW, LmERTY AND PSYCHATRY (1963); PsYcmAIuc JusncE (1965); ThE
MANuFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); IDEOLOGY AND INSANIY (1970); and many journal
and magazine articles.
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rather as maladaptations often reflecting deficiencies in character and
moral responsibility. Particularly, he believes justice should be blind,
making no distinction between the mentally ill or defective and the
normal-all should be held to the same standard of responsibility.
According to Szasz, psychiatric treatment in any form other than purely
voluntary, privately sought therapy engaged in solely for the benefit of
the individual represents an intolerable tyranny of the "therapeutic
state."25  This is a very seductive solution, appealing alike to the lib-
eral who is concerned about individual liberties and to the ultra-con-
servative who sees psychiatry as mitigating the strictness of the crimi-
nal law, a law which he believes is already too indulgent to the of-
fender. Further, Szaszs scheme should be easy to put in operation:
psychiatrists should withdraw completely from participation in any as-
pect of the criminal justice system, and the law should abandon all
recognition of mental or emotional disorder as relevant to the determi-
nation of responsibility and the subsequent disposition of the offender.
Although I believe Szasz's "myth of mental illness" thesis to be scien-
tifically and professionally unsound,20 Szasz has, nevertheless, raised
such serious questions relevant to the use of psychiatry by the law
that one can never retreat back to the hopeful and somewhat naive
days of Durham. I had hoped that Brawner would give particular
attention to these libertarian issues. However, the court makes it
clear that any truly radical solutions, such as abolition of the insanity
defense altogether, is a matter for legislative rather than judicial action,
and does not consider the related questions further.
2 7
SOCIAL FACTORS AS EXCULPATING
Another possible response to the limitations of psychiatry, as exper-
ienced by the criminal justice system, would be to broaden the per-
spective of the law, yet still retain the concept of exculpation and miti-
gation toward those who are less capable than the normal person to
exercise the free will which the law insists is the basis of all criminal
justice. Thus, the law could be "demedicalized" (to coin a word)
by extending legal exculpation to all those persons who for any reason
lack the ability to make a free, rational, responsible decision when faced
25. T. SzAsz, LAw, LiBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 216 (1963).
26. Diamond, Book Review, 52 CALiF. L. RyV. 899 (1964) (review of T. SzAsz,
LAw, LaERTY AN) PsYcHATRY).
27. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Vol. 1973:1091
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with the temptation or impulse to commit a crime. Such exculpatory
reasons might well include poverty, continued unemployment, chaotic
living conditions, such as that associated with ghettos, and other social
and environmental detrimental factors which could impair an indi-
vidual's powers of free will without necessarily resulting in a disease
or mental abnormality. Thus, proper attention could directly be given
by the law to cultural deprivation and other external factors which
override the individual's capacity for free choice.
Brawner does acknowledge that social and cultural determinants are
relevant to the issues of criminal responsibility, but only insofar as
they result in an "abnormal condition of the mind. ' 28  Thus, all such
evidence of social and cultural abnormality must be filtered through
the medical funnel of mental abnormality (at best a synthetic con-
struct and statistical abstraction), regardless of the McDonald defini-
tion. 29 The court asserts:
Our recognition of an insanity defense for those who lack the essential,
threshold free will possessed by those in the normal range is not to be
twisted, directly or indirectly, into a device for exculpation of those
without an abnormal condition of the mind.30
Such a statement is an open invitation to indulge in the invidious
semantic quibbling that has characterized so much forensic psychiatry
in the past. The expert may simply assert that, in his view, lack of
the power of free will by the defendant is proof in itself of mental
abnormality; that mentally normal persons are presumed to have the
power of free will, ergo, this defendant who has been shown to lack
free will because of, let us say, cultural deprivation, is by definition
mentally abnormal, for he is deficient in one of the essential elements
of mental normality. This is simply not a good way to deal with
such a fundamental and controversial issue. When the court states
Finally, we have not accepted suggestions to adopt a rule that disen-
tangles the insanity defense from a medical model, and announces a
standard exculpating anyone whose capacity for control is insubstan-
tial, for whatever cause or reason.31
it has not clarified the role of social, cultural and environmental fac-
tors in exculpating from responsibility. But it does thwart the further
28. Id. at 995.
29. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
30. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31. Id.
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"demedicalization" of the whole issue of criminal responsibility and
so deprives the law of one possibly satisfactory direction for reform.
VETERANS OF THE WAR AGAINST CRIME
Another possible response to the limitations of the medical-psychi-
atric approach to the offender, especially to the problem of the prob-
able incompatabilities of custodial confinement with its inevitable pun-
itive implications and the rehabilitative needs of the offender, is to
drop all pretense that rehabilitation can be accomplished within a cus-
todial institution. Instead, a system of sequential, rather than simul-
taneous, custody, punishment and reformative treatment could be in-
troduced.
I have long been convinced that one of the major obstacles to the
success of treatment programs within maximum security institutions,
for both the mentally ill and the mentally sound, is the prevailing atti-
tude of hypocritical cynicism, shared by inmate and staff alike. The
official posture of such an institution is that the institutional mission
is therapy. To the inmate the impact of the institutional experience
may be solely that of deprivation and punishment. Yet the inmate
quickly learns that he must give lip service to the therapeutic process
if he is ever to be released. And so a complex confidence game re-
sults, in which the staff administers treatments which they know full
well to be ineffective and inadequate to inmates who are quite aware
that they are not being treated but are undergoing punishment. If
either staff or inmates protest or otherwise acknowledge this hypo-
critical, phony situation, there may be severe consequences. The staff
member may find himself in a more difficult, less rewarding position,
and the inmate may be labeled as uncooperative or even incorrigible
and untreatable.
A simple solution could be devised: the offender, sane or insane,
would be confined, under as humane conditions as possible, for what-
ever fixed term is deemed appropriate to protect society against his
potential danger and which meets the public standards of elementary
fairness. Having served his term, the former offender could then be
regarded as a veteran of the war against crime, and like other veterans
would be entitled to benefits for the purpose of making restitution for
the damage done to him by his involuntary institutionalization and to
facilitate his restoration back into the community as a functioning citi-
zen. Such benefits might include monetary compensation, educational
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and vocational training, and job placement, as well as medical and
psychiatric treatment. Such benefits would be very real, and not just
hypocritical gestures, for the recipient would be free from custody and
punishment, living in his own community, and participating volun-
tarily. I believe that such a system of benefits might become accept-
able to the public conscience if there were also comparable, or greater,
restitutive benefits to the victims of crime.
Such radical solutions as here discussed are, of course, not properly
subject to judicial decision of the nature of Brawner. However, such
imaginative possibilities should be studied by all those who might have
some influence on the future course of the laws concerned with crimi-
nal responsibility.
TiE A ERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CAVEAT
I am totally bewildered by the Brawner court's attitude towards the
caveat paragraph of the ALI rule, the notorious section 4.01 of the
Model Penal Code.32 Intended to exclude the "psychopathic person-
ality" from the benefits of a liberalized rule of insanity,83 repudiated
by the three psychiatrists who participated in the formulation of the
ALI rule,34 and recently rejected by two federal circuits,3 Brawner
indulges in the most extraordinary quibbling about this. The logic
of the court's "pragmatic solution"3 6 to include the caveat paragraph
as a rule for application by the judge, but not for inclusion in instruc-
tions for the jury, escapes me. The court requires that:
The introduction or proffer of past criminal and anti-social actions
is not admissible as evidence of mental disease unless accompanied by
expert testimony, supported by a showing of the concordance of a re-
sponsible segment of professional opinion, that the particular charac-
teristics of these actions constitute convincing evidence of an underly-
ing mental disease that substantially impairs behavioral controls.3 7
This requirement seems to mean that not only must there be expert
testimony at the trial, but there must be additional expert testimony
32. Id. at 992-94.
33. Id. at 993.
34. Freedman, Guttmacher & Overholser, Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Re-
sponsibility, a Psychiatric View of the American Law Institute: Model Penal Code Pro-
posal, 118 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 32 (1961).
35. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith,
404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968).
36. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37. Id.
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as to the "expertness" of the original expert testimony. Or does this
requirement mean that the psychiatric expert must bring into court
volumes of psychiatric journals and textbooks verifying that a "re-
sponsible segment" of his colleagues agree with him?
The Brawner court's equivocation, as exemplified by its comments
on the ALI caveat, typifies to some extent the quality of the entire
decision. Granted, a remodeling of Durham was long overdue, but
when the Court of Appeals could have responded with bold, incisive
strokes, it produced only indecisive, equivocal and timid changes which
will not make any practical difference and will only add to the general
confusion surrounding the insanity defense. This is well summarized
by Chief Judge Bazelon, in his concurring opinion:
I fear that it can fairly be said of Brawner, just as it should be said of
Durham, that while the generals are designing an inspiring new insignia
for the standard, the battle is being lost in the trenches.38
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY (CAPACITY)
For the first time in the District of Columbia, recognition is given
to the so-called "diminished responsibility" defense.3 9 The inade-
quacies of Fisher v. United States4" are acknowledged and the
Brawner court thoroughly disposes of the misconceived idea that the
Supreme Court's affirmation of Fisher prohibited the adoption of the
diminished responsibility defense. 41
But here too, the Court of Appeals was unable to avoid its tendency
to equivocate. It accepts the relevance of psychiatric evidence of im-
pairment of capacity to premeditate and deliberate and so reduce what
would otherwise be first degree to second degree murder, but it does
not apply the same principle to capacity for malice, reducing murder
to manslaughter. Here, as elsewhere in the Brawner decision, the
court does not come to grips with the real issues, and much of the ex-
tensive discussion which permeates this decision seems strangely ir-
relevant to the critical problems to which the court addresses itself.
Surely, if the D.C. Circuit Court wished to adopt a doctrine with such far-
reaching consequences as the diminished responsibility (or capacity) de-
fense, it should have approached that subject in a more sophisticated
38. Id. at 1012 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
39. In California this is usually referred to as the diminished capacity defense.
40. 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
41. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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manner, rather than dismissing it as "a matter that requires further analy-
sis and reflection."42
Experience with the diminished responsibility (or capacity) defense
has been extensive in England and in California, 4 and indicates that
this defense does not just supplement the insanity defense, but tends
to supersede it, since it offers what may well be a much more rational
solution to the problem of the mentally ill offender.44
CONCLUSION
Brawner is proof, in itself, of the failure of Durham. But Judge
Bazelon is entirely correct when he says:
Durham was designed to throw open the windows of the defense and
ventilate a musty doctrine with all of the information acquired during a
century's study of the intricacies of human behavior. It fueled a long
and instructive debate which uncovered a vast range of perplexing and
previously hidden questions. And the decision helped to move the ques-
tion of responsibility from the realm of esoterica into the forefront of
the critical issues of the criminal law.45
As such it will long remain as one of the great milestone decisions of
the criminal law.
I fail to see that Brawner will have much historical significance
other than marking the end of Durham. It adds nothing that is truly
new to the law, it blazes no new paths, it perpetuates much that is
uninspired and mediocre. It is full of compromise and equivocation,
and fails to remedy the problems which Durham valiantly, if unsuc-
cessfully, struggled to resolve. It seems likely that these problems are
not soluble by such simplistic devices as reformulations of the rules
of criminal responsibility. But it required eighteen years experience
with Durham to demonstrate fully that this is so. Brawner does not
42. Id. at 1002 n.75.
43. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911 (1966); People v. Wolff,
61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959 (1964); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d
492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); English Homicide
Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c.11, § 2(1) (1957).
44. See Cooper, Diminished Capacity, 4 LOYOLA U.L. Rnv. 308 (1971); Dia-
mond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. Rlv. 59 (1961); Hasse,
Keeping Wolff from the Door: California's Diminished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 1641 (1972).
45. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, CJ.
concurring).
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seem to give proper recognition to the lessons to be learned from this
experience, and it fails to address the real problems of the criminal
law: how to combine compassionate attitudes towards the mentally
ill with the urgencies of societal protection; how to respect and enhance
the rights of the individual, protecting him against the unrestricted
authority of the state as well as from the call for vengeance by the
inflamed and fearful public, yet still enunciate a principle of fairness
and justice.
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